MuSig
A Schnorr-based multi-signature scheme that aggregates multiple public keys into one, reducing transaction size and improving privacy.
MuSig is a Schnorr-based n-of-n multi-signature aggregation protocol. Multiple cosigners interact to produce a single combined public key and a single combined signature. On-chain, the result is indistinguishable from a standard single-sig spend. Originally published in 2018 by Maxwell, Poelstra, Seurin, and Wuille.
The original MuSig paper first proposed a two-round protocol, but its security proof was found to be flawed and the scheme is breakable under concurrent signing sessions using Wagner's algorithm. The fix was a three-round protocol with an explicit nonce-commitment round. (Key-cancellation, or rogue-key, attacks are a separate problem that MuSig's key-aggregation coefficients already solve.) That worked, but three rounds of round-trips between cosigners is operationally painful.
MuSig2 (2020, Nick / Ruffing / Seurin) replaced original MuSig in practice. MuSig2 uses a different mathematical approach to achieve the same security in just two rounds, with the additional benefit that the first round can be pre-computed before the message is known. Each nonce is still single-use; reusing one across sessions leaks the private key. Almost every modern implementation that talks about "MuSig" really means MuSig2.
Key properties (shared by both versions):
- n-of-n only. All cosigners must participate. For m-of-n threshold setups, use FROST instead.
- Aggregated public key. The combined key is a deterministic function of the cosigner public keys. Anyone can compute it; nobody needs to share private material.
- Single 64-byte signature. Same size as Taproot single-sig.
- Privacy. A MuSig spend looks like any other Taproot key-path spend. The cosigner structure stays off-chain.
Where MuSig (2) shows up in practice:
- Lightning channels post-Taproot. Cooperative closes can use MuSig2 to keep the on-chain footprint identical to a single-sig spend.
- Custodial / institutional multisig. Replaces classical 2-of-2 or 3-of-3 setups where privacy and fee efficiency matter.
- Federations. Smaller (n-of-n) federations can aggregate; threshold federations need a scheme like FROST, whose Bitcoin spec (BIP 445) is still a draft as of October 2026.
If you're researching modern Bitcoin multisig and the docs say "MuSig," assume MuSig2 unless they specifically call out the older version. The original is mostly historical interest now.
See How Taproot Actually Works for the key-path spend that aggregation makes possible.
Key takeaways
- Aggregates multiple pubkeys/signatures into one compact signature
- Improves privacy and fee efficiency for multi-party transactions
- Relies on Schnorr signatures introduced with Taproot
Corrected
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Was: The entry blamed the original MuSig's problem on a key-cancellation attack and said MuSig2 nonces can be reused across signing sessions.
Now: The original two-round MuSig had a flawed security proof and could be attacked across concurrent signing sessions, which is why it moved to three rounds; key cancellation is a separate attack its design already handled. The corrected entry says this and that each MuSig2 nonce is single-use. Details
Sources (1)
External references (1)
Related terms (14)
- PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction)
- ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm)
- Elliptic Curve
- HDM (Multi-Signature HD Wallet)
- Hierarchical Multisig
- Interactive Multi-Sig
- M-of-n
- Mono-Signature
- MuSig2
- Partial Signature
- Quorum Signatures
- Schnorr Signature
- Signature Aggregation
- Signature Clipping
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