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Paying the same Bitcoin address more than once. It hands your full history, in one place, to anyone watching, puts every coin at the address behind one key, and, once that key has signed, leaves later deposits sitting in the open. Modern wallets avoid it by default.
Read full entryRabbit Hole · 15 min
One bitcoin in four sits at an address that was spent from and then paid again. What a reused address gives away, to whom, why it keeps happening eighteen years after the whitepaper said not to, and how to stop without rushing.
Rabbit Hole · 40 min
Bitcoin is dead, they said, and a Ponzi scheme, a tulip bubble, rat poison and money for drug dealers and terrorists. Every label, who said it and when, which ones can actually be scored, and what happened next, including the calls that held up and the ones our own side got wrong.
Rabbit Hole · 14 min
On 11 March 2013 a software upgrade split Bitcoin into two chains. Developers, pool operators and exchanges argued it out in a public chat room and put it back together in under eight hours. This is the log, with the timestamps.
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Use It Once: Why Reusing a Bitcoin Address Is Dangerous
It now says fresh addresses shrink the damage without repairing the generator: if a wallet's random numbers were bad, every key it made with them is suspect, which is why the bitcoin.org alert of 11 August 2013 called for new keys from 'a repaired random number generator', not just for new addresses.
What was wrong
The requester publishes a public point, the searcher returns an offset, and the requester adds the two to get the full private key, which only the searcher never learns; the entry says so and tells the reader to check the address before funding it. 1BitcoinEater is described as the opposite construction (hand-written text with a computed checksum, no key search, no key) and linked to the burn-address entry, with BitMEX's 3BMEX deposit addresses as the genuine example. The tools are VanitySearch and vanitygen++, with a note that the original vanitygen is Base58-only. Taproot prefixes take the same number of tries but cost more per try, and a service hands over a private key, not a seed.
What was wrong
BIP-360 says a P2MR output becomes vulnerable to long-exposure attacks whenever one of its scripts reveals a public key, so the protection depends on not reusing keys. P2MR is a destination for coins that move to it and does nothing for keys that stay exposed. Neither BIP mentions the other, and BIP-361 lists a post-quantum signature BIP as its requirement, which P2MR is not. The entry now says all three.
What was wrong