Fake PGP key for Gavin
6 messages, 22 to 24 Mar 2014. Started by Mike Hearn.
Mike Hearn, Gavin Andresen, Peter Todd, Oliver Egginger, Troy Benjegerdes, The Doctor
In case you didn't see this yet,
http://gavintech.blogspot.ch/2014/03/it-aint-me-ive-got-pgp-imposter.html
If you're using PGP to verify Bitcoin downloads, it's very important that you check you are using the right key. Someone seems to be creating fake PGP keys that are used to sign popular pieces of crypto software, probably to make a MITM attack (e.g. from an intelligence agency) seem more legitimate.
I think the Mac DMG's of Core are signed for Gatekeeper, but do we codesign the Windows binaries? If not it'd be a good idea, if only because AV scanners learn key reputations to reduce false positives. Of course this is not a panacea, and Linux unfortunately does not support X.509 code signing, but having extra signing can't really hurt.
On Sat, Mar 22, 2014 at 1:03 PM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99•net> wrote:
Quoted text (1 line)
> do we codesign the Windows binaries?
Yes, the -setup.exe installers are Authenticode (or whatever Microsoft is calling that these days) code-signed.
On Sat, Mar 22, 2014 at 06:03:03PM +0100, Mike Hearn wrote:
Quoted text (9 lines)
> In case you didn't see this yet, > > http://gavintech.blogspot.ch/2014/03/it-aint-me-ive-got-pgp-imposter.html > > If you're using PGP to verify Bitcoin downloads, it's very important that > you check you are using the right key. Someone seems to be creating fake > PGP keys that are used to sign popular pieces of crypto software, probably > to make a MITM attack (e.g. from an intelligence agency) seem more > legitimate.
Note that Bitcoin source and binary downloads are protected by both the PGP WoT and the certificate authority PKI system. The binaries are hosted on bitcoin.org, which is https and protected by a the PKI system, and the source code is hosted on github, again, https protected. A MITM attack would need to compromise the PKI system as well, at least provided users aren't fooled into downloading over http.
Am 22.03.2014 18:03, schrieb Mike Hearn:
Quoted text (9 lines)
> In case you didn't see this yet, > > http://gavintech.blogspot.ch/2014/03/it-aint-me-ive-got-pgp-imposter.html > > If you're using PGP to verify Bitcoin downloads, it's very important > that you check you are using the right key. Someone seems to be creating > fake PGP keys that are used to sign popular pieces of crypto software, > probably to make a MITM attack (e.g. from an intelligence agency) seem > more legitimate.
From the user's perspective: In the beginning I found it difficult to find the keys. At last I have made this side for documentation:
https://www.olivere.de/blog/archives/2013/06/02/install_bitcoin_client/
Okay, is outdated meanwhile ...
Normally people fetch the keys by key-id from a well known key server. Not because they are paranoid, but because it is the most convenient method under Linux.
A Google search for Gavin+Andresen+gpg brings me herein:
http://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/message/30551147/
Key-Id?
Nevertheless, I'm glad that you guys signed anything. That makes me sleep better. I really check this.
- oliver
On Sat, Mar 22, 2014 at 06:03:03PM +0100, Mike Hearn wrote:
Quoted text (9 lines)
> In case you didn't see this yet, > > http://gavintech.blogspot.ch/2014/03/it-aint-me-ive-got-pgp-imposter.html > > If you're using PGP to verify Bitcoin downloads, it's very important that > you check you are using the right key. Someone seems to be creating fake > PGP keys that are used to sign popular pieces of crypto software, probably > to make a MITM attack (e.g. from an intelligence agency) seem more > legitimate.
I find it more likely that fake PGP keys are from corporate industrial espionage and/or organized crime outfits. Intelligence agencies will stick to compromised X509, network cards, and binary code blobs.
Besides, why would an intelligence agency want your bitcoin when they can just intercept ASIC miners and make their own?
Quoted text (5 lines)
> I think the Mac DMG's of Core are signed for Gatekeeper, but do we codesign > the Windows binaries? If not it'd be a good idea, if only because AV > scanners learn key reputations to reduce false positives. Of course this is > not a panacea, and Linux unfortunately does not support X.509 code signing, > but having extra signing can't really hurt.
Uhhmm, real operating system use package managers with PGP instead of pre- compromised X.509 nonsense. https://wiki.debian.org/SecureApt
On 03/23/2014 03:12 PM, Troy Benjegerdes wrote:
Quoted text (4 lines)
> I find it more likely that fake PGP keys are from corporate > industrial espionage and/or organized crime outfits. Intelligence > agencies will stick to compromised X509, network cards, and binary > code blobs.
We're seeing the same thing happen to a couple of developers active in the censorship circumvention problem space as well (though it's not for the first time it's happened).
Quoted text (2 lines)
> Besides, why would an intelligence agency want your bitcoin when > they can just intercept ASIC miners and make their own?
Perhaps they have other motives for attempting a cybil attack against developers than trying to acquire Bitcoins. Say, by making it easier to subtitute alternate versions which are instrumented to make the users easier to spy upon and later take down?
- -- The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS] Developer, Project Byzantium: http://project-byzantium.org/
PGP: 0x807B17C1 / 7960 1CDC 85C9 0B63 8D9F DD89 3BD8 FF2B 807B 17C1 WWW: https://drwho.virtadpt.net/
"The enemies know the system. The allies do not." --Jay Jacobs