bip44 GPG identities - POC demo

If anyone is interested in using a bip44 Wallet to generate deterministic GPG identities, I have implemented a demonstration in javascript.

http://memwallet.info/bip44ext/test.html

this allows a user to manage a GPG identity for encryption and signing with zero bytes of permanent storage. (on tails for example)

Paper is here still:

https://github.com/taelfrinn/bip44extention/blob/master/README.md

One minor correction added which specifies that the smallest S value should be used, to prevent different ecdsa implementations from creating non-canonical/identical outputs.

comments welcome

On 07/03/15 16:53, Mem Wallet wrote:

> this allows a user to manage a GPG identity for encryption
> and signing with zero bytes of permanent storage. (on tails for example)

Hi!

As an author of BIP44 I don't think that you should use BIP44 for this and a new BIP number should be allocated. To me it does not make much sense to create GPG key hierarchy per Bitcoin account, but rather create a GPG key hierarchy per device/master seed.

I am currently in process of implementing a SignIdentity message for TREZOR, which will be used for HTTPS/SSH/etc. logins.

See PoC here: https://github.com/trezor/trezor-emu/commit/9f612c286cc7b8268ebaec4a36757e1c19548717

The idea is to derive the BIP32 path from HTTPS/SSH URI (by hashing it and use m/46'/a'/b'/c'/d' where a,b,c,d are first 4*32 bits of the hash) and use that to derive the private key. This scheme might work for GPG keys (just use gpg://user@host.com for the URI) as well.

Den 8 mar 2015 02:36 skrev "Pavol Rusnak" <stick@gk2•sk>:

>
> On 07/03/15 16:53, Mem Wallet wrote:

[...]

> I am currently in process of implementing a SignIdentity message for
> TREZOR, which will be used for HTTPS/SSH/etc. logins.
>
> See PoC here:
>

https://github.com/trezor/trezor-emu/commit/9f612c286cc7b8268ebaec4a36757e1c19548717

>
> The idea is to derive the BIP32 path from HTTPS/SSH URI (by hashing it
> and use m/46'/a'/b'/c'/d' where a,b,c,d are first 4*32 bits of the hash)
> and use that to derive the private key. This scheme might work for GPG
> keys (just use gpg://user@host.com for the URI) as well.

Reminds me of FIDO's U2F protocol.

http://fidoalliance.org/specifications https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-hardware/fido-u2f-security-key/

It ties into the browser SSL session to make sure only the correct server can get the correct response for the challenge-response protocol, so that credentials phishing is blocked and worthless. A unique keypair is generated for each service for privacy, so that you can't easily be identified across services from the usage of the device alone (thus safe for people with multiple pseudonyms).