Yet another Taproot activation logic
3 messages, 7 to 8 Mar 2021. Started by Carlo Spiller.
Carlo Spiller (2), Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces
Hi everybody
I'm new to this list, but not new to Bitcoin, having skin in the game since 2014. I was there for the scaling war and the drama around SegWit, as a simple user. This time, I run my own full node and follow development. I hope to bring something new to the table.
Having witnessed the miner's unwillingness to activate SegWit truly makes me concerened for a simple LOT=false. After reading the discussion now for some time and thinking about it myself, I have come to the following proposal.
Initially deploy with LOT=false and an activation threshold of 95% of miner signaling.
*IFF* after 6 months Taproot is not activated by MASF, BUT at least 80% of hashpower signaled for the upgrade, LOT gets a lock-in date another 6 months later and the threshold for MASF is lowered to 90%.
If after the initial 6 months of signaling with LOT=false, 80% is not reached, the proposal expires.
This way, a small percent of hashpower does not get to stall activation, rather, 80% of hashpower can activate LOT=true, and later, 90% can activate Taproot. If a flaw is found in Taproot in the first six months (unlikely anyway), miners simply don't signal and the proposal expires. If miners don't signal at all, only six months are lost, before a new activation logic can be deployed.
Don't mind this if something similar was already proposed somewhere else.
Best
Carlo
Hi Carlo
This your proposal is similar to the Simple Majority Activation proposal (SMA). The difference is that your proposal has the final activation threshold set to 80% and SMA has it set to 51% https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-March/018587.html
The problem with what you're proposing is what do users do if signaling is somewhere between 51% to 79%? Users that want to promote a UASF know that their miner majority can activate Taproot and activate without the 21% to 49% of miners needing to signal (or purposefully stalling). A UASF knows they have majority mining power so there is little risk to them and a big reward (activating Taproot) so they are incentivized to do a UASF.
A UASF with a miner majority can scare everyone else about them being at risk of big reorgs to gain traction and followers.
With the same proposal but the final threshold set to 51% instead of 80% there can't be risk of a UASF because if 51% is not reached they know they don't have enough miner support to keep the chain together.
If support is less than 50% a UASF movement needs to hard fork anyway to change the PoW (for protection) and change addresses to prevent double spends.
I really like the SMA proposal with 51% because it removes the incentive to do a UASF.
Cheers Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces
On Mar 7, 2021, 6:37 AM, at 6:37 AM, Carlo Spiller via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation•org> wrote:
Quoted text (47 lines)
>Hi everybody > >I'm new to this list, but not new to Bitcoin, having skin in the game >since 2014. I was there for the scaling war and the drama around >SegWit, >as a simple user. This time, I run my own full node and follow >development. I hope to bring something new to the table. > >Having witnessed the miner's unwillingness to activate SegWit truly >makes me concerened for a simple LOT=false. After reading the >discussion >now for some time and thinking about it myself, I have come to the >following proposal. > >Initially deploy with LOT=false and an activation threshold of 95% of >miner signaling. > >*IFF* after 6 months Taproot is not activated by MASF, BUT at least 80% > >of hashpower signaled for the upgrade, LOT gets a lock-in date another >6 >months later and the threshold for MASF is lowered to 90%. > >If after the initial 6 months of signaling with LOT=false, 80% is not >reached, the proposal expires. > >This way, a small percent of hashpower does not get to stall >activation, >rather, 80% of hashpower can activate LOT=true, and later, 90% can >activate Taproot. If a flaw is found in Taproot in the first six months > >(unlikely anyway), miners simply don't signal and the proposal expires. > >If miners don't signal at all, only six months are lost, before a new >activation logic can be deployed. > >Don't mind this if something similar was already proposed somewhere >else. > >Best > >Carlo > >_______________________________________________ >bitcoin-dev mailing list >bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation•org >https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Hi Ariel
Thanks for your reply with the link to the SMA proposal, which I had missed previoulsy. It is indeed very similar.
I see that Speedy trial is currently gaining broad support, which is good. I think my proposal with the threshold set to 51% instead of 80% to change LOT=false to LOT=true is also pretty similar to ST, with the key difference being that the next step after a fail of MASF is already baked in.
Excited to see how it all plays out.
Best
Carlo
Carlo Spiller +41 79 368 85 06 www.carlospiller.com
Am 07.03.21 um 22:13 schrieb Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces:
Quoted text (77 lines)
> Hi Carlo > > This your proposal is similar to the Simple Majority Activation > proposal (SMA). The difference is that your proposal has the final > activation threshold set to 80% and SMA has it set to 51% > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-March/018587.html > <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-March/018587.html> > > The problem with what you're proposing is what do users do if > signaling is somewhere between 51% to 79%? Users that want to promote > a UASF know that their miner majority can activate Taproot and > activate without the 21% to 49% of miners needing to signal (or > purposefully stalling). A UASF knows they have majority mining power > so there is little risk to them and a big reward (activating Taproot) > so they are incentivized to do a UASF. > > A UASF with a miner majority can scare everyone else about them being > at risk of big reorgs to gain traction and followers. > > With the same proposal but the final threshold set to 51% instead of > 80% there can't be risk of a UASF because if 51% is not reached they > know they don't have enough miner support to keep the chain together. > > If support is less than 50% a UASF movement needs to hard fork anyway > to change the PoW (for protection) and change addresses to prevent > double spends. > > I really like the SMA proposal with 51% because it removes the > incentive to do a UASF. > > Cheers > Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces > On Mar 7, 2021, at 6:37 AM, Carlo Spiller via bitcoin-dev > <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation•org > <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>> wrote: > > Hi everybody > > I'm new to this list, but not new to Bitcoin, having skin in the game > since 2014. I was there for the scaling war and the drama around SegWit, > as a simple user. This time, I run my own full node and follow > development. I hope to bring something new to the table. > > Having witnessed the miner's unwillingness to activate SegWit truly > makes me concerened for a simple LOT=false. After reading the discussion > now for some time and thinking about it myself, I have come to the > following proposal. > > Initially deploy with LOT=false and an activation threshold of 95% of > miner signaling. > > *IFF* after 6 months Taproot is not activated by MASF, BUT at least 80% > of hashpower signaled for the upgrade, LOT gets a lock-in date another 6 > months later and the threshold for MASF is lowered to 90%. > > If after the initial 6 months of signaling with LOT=false, 80% is not > reached, the proposal expires. > > This way, a small percent of hashpower does not get to stall activation, > rather, 80% of hashpower can activate LOT=true, and later, 90% can > activate Taproot. If a flaw is found in Taproot in the first six months > (unlikely anyway), miners simply don't signal and the proposal expires. > If miners don't signal at all, only six months are lost, before a new > activation logic can be deployed. > > Don't mind this if something similar was already proposed somewhere else. > > Best > > Carlo > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation•org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev> >