Demonstrating Pinning Attacks under Real-World Conditions
6 messages, 27 Aug to 12 Oct 2024. Started by Antoine Riard.
Antoine Riard (4), Peter Todd, waxwing/ AdamISZ
Hi list,
I'm following-up on Dave Harding''s proposition in another recent email thread.
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> How would that work? AFAIK, there's no LN software using TRUC, very few > relay nodes are using it (since it isn't yet enabled by default in a > release version), and no miners are using it (again, since it hasn't > been released). I'm willing to put money at stake to settle a > disagreement that can't be settled with words, but I want to at least > learn something from the process.
I think it would benefit greatly the bitcoin ecosystem to have in place few lightning nodes running on mainnet, against which folks can freely exercise sophisticated cross-layers attacks (e.g pinning) to demonstrate their feasibility and severity, in a plain fashion.
Indeed, this is one thing to execute an attack on a private regtest or even testnet, another on mainnet in real-world conditions where the results can be evaluated and discussed by a wide audience. I already call to put in place such attack demonstration experiences in the past (cf. in the context of the transaction relay workshop in 2021 [0]) and it would be more akin to the research standards at major sec confs demanding for artifacts.
So if we have more candidates, beyond Dave, who wish to put in place "free-to-pown" lightning nodes, the basic setup could be the following for useful demo attacks results: - a full-node (e.g core or btcd) - a ligtning node (e.g core-lightning / ldk / lnd) - running default mainnet setting for both softwares
What else ?
It is more interesting to run with default mainnet settings, as testnet / regtest have usually myriads of specific behaviors and have all the real mempools congestion cycles to deal with. As someone wishing to do attack demo, I'm fine pouring the satoshis funds to open new channels, you only need to be above the dust threshold to exercise interesting attacks.
A cynical observer of bitcoin and lightning protocol development (of which, of course I'm not !), could say that given the level of technical complexity of a full-node software and a lightning implementation and the hardness to evaluate cross-layer attacks like pinning, some lightning domain experts and maintainers are deliberately abusing the belief of lightning end-users about the protocol robustness and as such misleading end-users about the safety of their moneys (and LSPs about the viability of their economics units) [1].
From the viewpoint of a security researcher wishing to demonstrate the feasibility and severity of some cross-layers attacks in bitcoin, having running public nodes would be very useful. There is also the option to do that on private infra and come back with a trace on mainnet, though it would lose its public verifiability aspect.
My utmost pleasure to demonstrate some pinning attacks on nodes under real-world conditions.
Cheers, Antoine ots hash: 63f58d2557beef5eb1b04f530f91d3febd682ae078933790fcdc1ac94356cf40
[0] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-May/018925.html [1] And on that regard, it's often the ones who are spending their time on social medias and numerous podcasts whining about the purity of their intention or always recalling their FOSS veterans credentials as some mark of authority who are the more suspicious to falter about some sense of accountability towards end-users...It can be good to re-read Nietzsche.
On Tue, Aug 27, 2024 at 02:10:15PM -0700, Antoine Riard wrote:
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> My utmost pleasure to demonstrate some pinning attacks on nodes under > real-world conditions.
Antoine Riard: until Oct 1st, you have permission to test your attacks against my Lightning node running at:
023345274dd80a01c0e80ec48928188783f9bc5281be8f5057c050492f10711a5b@alice•opentimestamps•org:9735
That also happens to be my Alice OpenTimestamps calendar, in production, so please don't do anything you expect to be CPU or RAM intensive. But if you accidentally take down the server, not the end of the world: OTS is a very redundant protocol and one calendar going down for a few hours is unlikely to do any harm.
It has about $400 of outgoing capacity at the moment, and $2000 inbound. It gets hardly any donations at the moment, so if you manage to knock LND offline that's no big deal.
That's not my money - it's donations to the OTS calendars that I have no right to spend - so I'll ask you to pay for any expenses incurred by it during testing, and make a $100 net donation when you're done testing to make it worthwhile for the OTS community. If you manage to lose more than that on justice transactions, I'll consider that a donation. :)
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> That also happens to be my Alice OpenTimestamps calendar, in production,
so
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> please don't do anything you expect to be CPU or RAM intensive. But if you > accidentally take down the server, not the end of the world: OTS is a very > redundant protocol and one calendar going down for a few hours is
unlikely to
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> do any harm. > > It has about $400 of outgoing capacity at the moment, and $2000 inbound.
It
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> gets hardly any donations at the moment, so if you manage to knock LND
offline
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> that's no big deal. > > That's not my money - it's donations to the OTS calendars that I have no
right
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> to spend - so I'll ask you to pay for any expenses incurred by it during > testing, and make a $100 net donation when you're done testing to make it > worthwhile for the OTS community. If you manage to lose more than that on > justice transactions, I'll consider that a donation. :)
Many thanks Peter for that.
No worries, I won't play with CPU or RAM, it's just all the transaction-relay and mempool logic that one can interfere with. I'll make you whole of the $2400 if the LND node goes down too hard, though I'm just looking for a node running on mainnet, for a pinning the attacker has two open to channels and re-balance the liquidity at its advantage a bit. I'll provide the liquidity by myself.
If you have an on-chain donation address on the OTS website (?), I'll make a $100 donation now, it's a nice tool. And for the justice transaction...well for some scenarios you can use the latest valid commitment state to pin no risk of being slashed by a justice transaction.
Best, Antoine ots hash: 19d9b61ed5238e2922205a0a0194e0830b260a691f45b4189b1d145f72c9e031
Le mar. 3 sept. 2024 à 13:58, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org> a écrit :
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> On Tue, Aug 27, 2024 at 02:10:15PM -0700, Antoine Riard wrote: > > My utmost pleasure to demonstrate some pinning attacks on nodes under > > real-world conditions. > > Antoine Riard: until Oct 1st, you have permission to test your attacks > against > my Lightning node running at: > > > 023345274dd80a01c0e80ec48928188783f9bc5281be8f5057c050492f10711a5b@alice•opentimestamps•org:9735 > > That also happens to be my Alice OpenTimestamps calendar, in production, so > please don't do anything you expect to be CPU or RAM intensive. But if you > accidentally take down the server, not the end of the world: OTS is a very > redundant protocol and one calendar going down for a few hours is unlikely > to > do any harm. > > It has about $400 of outgoing capacity at the moment, and $2000 inbound. It > gets hardly any donations at the moment, so if you manage to knock LND > offline > that's no big deal. > > That's not my money - it's donations to the OTS calendars that I have no > right > to spend - so I'll ask you to pay for any expenses incurred by it during > testing, and make a $100 net donation when you're done testing to make it > worthwhile for the OTS community. If you manage to lose more than that on > justice transactions, I'll consider that a donation. :) > > -- > https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org >
Hi all,
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> If you have an on-chain donation address on the OTS website (?), I'll
make a
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> $100 donation now, it's a nice tool. And for the justice
transaction...well
Quoted text (1 line)
> for some scenarios you can use the latest valid commitment state to pin
no risk
Quoted text (1 line)
> of being slashed by a justice transaction.
Been late on demonstrating a real-world pinning attack against a production lightning node. But I swear it's real sport having to jungle with more than one category of exploit to soundly test.
OTS is a great project. I'll make a donation to it of 1 gram of gold or the equivalent in fiats or satoshis at settlement (as $100 sounds to be almost equal to 1 gram of gold, i.e $84.66 those days) for each month late on doing a demonstrationg of real-world pinning attack, as a lateness penalty.
Beyond it's a great tool to make notarization of any kind of digital info, inside the chain where for every block there are probably two-digit terawatt hours burnt, which starts to be a f*cking lot of hydro power plants.
More generally, I called since late 2020 at least for making real-world demonstration of pinning attacks against lightning nodes, among others types of cross-layers attacks, At the exception of 2 ligthning protocol devs if my memory is correct, all the others ones since then have shunned away from participating in a real-world demo, and Peter Todd was the first one to consent and make available a lightning node available for real-world demos in a "black box" fashion (indeed, it's far easier to execute exploits on testing envs fully set by the researcher...).
In the future, I believe it can only be great if bitcoin security exploits are gauged more or less on the lines of artifacts available, evaluated and reproduced, as done usually by major infosec confs.
Best, Antoine ots hash: 9d227f7832154c4c8bce9fce260ac84537489c1bc8c4b8c2ba990ceb197c84fc Le mardi 3 septembre 2024 à 21:13:46 UTC+1, Antoine Riard a écrit :
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> > That also happens to be my Alice OpenTimestamps calendar, in production, > so > > please don't do anything you expect to be CPU or RAM intensive. But if > you > > accidentally take down the server, not the end of the world: OTS is a > very > > redundant protocol and one calendar going down for a few hours is > unlikely to > > do any harm. > > > > It has about $400 of outgoing capacity at the moment, and $2000 inbound. > It > > gets hardly any donations at the moment, so if you manage to knock LND > offline > > that's no big deal. > > > > That's not my money - it's donations to the OTS calendars that I have no > right > > to spend - so I'll ask you to pay for any expenses incurred by it during > > testing, and make a $100 net donation when you're done testing to make it > > worthwhile for the OTS community. If you manage to lose more than that on > > justice transactions, I'll consider that a donation. :) > > Many thanks Peter for that. > > No worries, I won't play with CPU or RAM, it's just all the > transaction-relay > and mempool logic that one can interfere with. I'll make you whole of the > $2400 > if the LND node goes down too hard, though I'm just looking for a node > running > on mainnet, for a pinning the attacker has two open to channels and > re-balance > the liquidity at its advantage a bit. I'll provide the liquidity by myself. > > If you have an on-chain donation address on the OTS website (?), I'll make > a > $100 donation now, it's a nice tool. And for the justice transaction...well > for some scenarios you can use the latest valid commitment state to pin no > risk > of being slashed by a justice transaction. > > Best, > Antoine > ots hash: 19d9b61ed5238e2922205a0a0194e0830b260a691f45b4189b1d145f72c9e031 > > Le mar. 3 sept. 2024 à 13:58, Peter Todd <pe...@petertodd•org> a écrit : > >> On Tue, Aug 27, 2024 at 02:10:15PM -0700, Antoine Riard wrote: >> > My utmost pleasure to demonstrate some pinning attacks on nodes under >> > real-world conditions. >> >> Antoine Riard: until Oct 1st, you have permission to test your attacks >> against >> my Lightning node running at: >> >> 023345274dd80a01c0e80ec4892818878...@alice•opentimestamps•org:9735 >> <http://023345274dd80a01c0e80ec48928188783f9bc5281be8f5057c050492f10711a5b@alice.opentimestamps.org:9735> >> >> That also happens to be my Alice OpenTimestamps calendar, in production, >> so >> please don't do anything you expect to be CPU or RAM intensive. But if you >> accidentally take down the server, not the end of the world: OTS is a very >> redundant protocol and one calendar going down for a few hours is >> unlikely to >> do any harm. >> >> It has about $400 of outgoing capacity at the moment, and $2000 inbound. >> It >> gets hardly any donations at the moment, so if you manage to knock LND >> offline >> that's no big deal. >> >> That's not my money - it's donations to the OTS calendars that I have no >> right >> to spend - so I'll ask you to pay for any expenses incurred by it during >> testing, and make a $100 net donation when you're done testing to make it >> worthwhile for the OTS community. If you manage to lose more than that on >> justice transactions, I'll consider that a donation. :) >> >> -- >> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org >> >
Antoine,
Perhaps it would be an idea to write a gist or some other public facing page with what you need from volunteers, so it's kind of step by step? Unlike Peter in this thread, I think most people would want/have to set up new nodes to do this.
You have said: Current and default installs of Core/btcd + lnd/cln/ldk . I know that e.g. Core has some pretty non-trivial choices but I guess we can stick religiously to whatever is default.
But other details like: amount in channels - does it matter? How many channels? Channels of specific types (thinking e.g. unannounced) Should volunteers have channels with each other? is there any aspect of topology you require? Network connectivity - I guess it's not important, but just in case worth mentioning, e.g. should/should not use Tor etc.
Forgive me if some of the questions are ignorant, I have not paid a ton of attention to the discussion around these attacks.
waxwing/AdamISZ On Thursday, October 10, 2024 at 6:29:02 PM UTC-6 Antoine Riard wrote:
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> Hi all, > > > If you have an on-chain donation address on the OTS website (?), I'll > make a > > $100 donation now, it's a nice tool. And for the justice > transaction...well > > for some scenarios you can use the latest valid commitment state to pin > no risk > > of being slashed by a justice transaction. > > Been late on demonstrating a real-world pinning attack against a > production lightning > node. But I swear it's real sport having to jungle with more than one > category of > exploit to soundly test. > > OTS is a great project. I'll make a donation to it of 1 gram of gold or > the equivalent > in fiats or satoshis at settlement (as $100 sounds to be almost equal to 1 > gram of gold, > i.e $84.66 those days) for each month late on doing a demonstrationg of > real-world pinning > attack, as a lateness penalty. > > Beyond it's a great tool to make notarization of any kind of digital info, > inside the > chain where for every block there are probably two-digit terawatt hours > burnt, which > starts to be a f*cking lot of hydro power plants. > > More generally, I called since late 2020 at least for making real-world > demonstration > of pinning attacks against lightning nodes, among others types of > cross-layers attacks, > At the exception of 2 ligthning protocol devs if my memory is correct, all > the others > ones since then have shunned away from participating in a real-world demo, > and Peter > Todd was the first one to consent and make available a lightning node > available for > real-world demos in a "black box" fashion (indeed, it's far easier to > execute exploits > on testing envs fully set by the researcher...). > > In the future, I believe it can only be great if bitcoin security exploits > are gauged > more or less on the lines of artifacts available, evaluated and > reproduced, as done > usually by major infosec confs. > > Best, > Antoine > ots hash: 9d227f7832154c4c8bce9fce260ac84537489c1bc8c4b8c2ba990ceb197c84fc > Le mardi 3 septembre 2024 à 21:13:46 UTC+1, Antoine Riard a écrit : > >> > That also happens to be my Alice OpenTimestamps calendar, in >> production, so >> > please don't do anything you expect to be CPU or RAM intensive. But if >> you >> > accidentally take down the server, not the end of the world: OTS is a >> very >> > redundant protocol and one calendar going down for a few hours is >> unlikely to >> > do any harm. >> > >> > It has about $400 of outgoing capacity at the moment, and $2000 >> inbound. It >> > gets hardly any donations at the moment, so if you manage to knock LND >> offline >> > that's no big deal. >> > >> > That's not my money - it's donations to the OTS calendars that I have >> no right >> > to spend - so I'll ask you to pay for any expenses incurred by it during >> > testing, and make a $100 net donation when you're done testing to make >> it >> > worthwhile for the OTS community. If you manage to lose more than that >> on >> > justice transactions, I'll consider that a donation. :) >> >> Many thanks Peter for that. >> >> No worries, I won't play with CPU or RAM, it's just all the >> transaction-relay >> and mempool logic that one can interfere with. I'll make you whole of the >> $2400 >> if the LND node goes down too hard, though I'm just looking for a node >> running >> on mainnet, for a pinning the attacker has two open to channels and >> re-balance >> the liquidity at its advantage a bit. I'll provide the liquidity by >> myself. >> >> If you have an on-chain donation address on the OTS website (?), I'll >> make a >> $100 donation now, it's a nice tool. And for the justice >> transaction...well >> for some scenarios you can use the latest valid commitment state to pin >> no risk >> of being slashed by a justice transaction. >> >> Best, >> Antoine >> ots hash: 19d9b61ed5238e2922205a0a0194e0830b260a691f45b4189b1d145f72c9e031 >> >> Le mar. 3 sept. 2024 à 13:58, Peter Todd <pe...@petertodd•org> a écrit : >> >>> On Tue, Aug 27, 2024 at 02:10:15PM -0700, Antoine Riard wrote: >>> > My utmost pleasure to demonstrate some pinning attacks on nodes under >>> > real-world conditions. >>> >>> Antoine Riard: until Oct 1st, you have permission to test your attacks >>> against >>> my Lightning node running at: >>> >>> 023345274dd80a01c0e80ec4892818878...@alice•opentimestamps•org:9735 >>> <http://023345274dd80a01c0e80ec48928188783f9bc5281be8f5057c050492f10711a5b@alice.opentimestamps.org:9735> >>> >>> That also happens to be my Alice OpenTimestamps calendar, in production, >>> so >>> please don't do anything you expect to be CPU or RAM intensive. But if >>> you >>> accidentally take down the server, not the end of the world: OTS is a >>> very >>> redundant protocol and one calendar going down for a few hours is >>> unlikely to >>> do any harm. >>> >>> It has about $400 of outgoing capacity at the moment, and $2000 inbound. >>> It >>> gets hardly any donations at the moment, so if you manage to knock LND >>> offline >>> that's no big deal. >>> >>> That's not my money - it's donations to the OTS calendars that I have no >>> right >>> to spend - so I'll ask you to pay for any expenses incurred by it during >>> testing, and make a $100 net donation when you're done testing to make it >>> worthwhile for the OTS community. If you manage to lose more than that on >>> justice transactions, I'll consider that a donation. :) >>> >>> -- >>> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org >>> >>
Hi waxwing,
Thanks for the idea of writing some gist, yes it's worthy to explain step-by-step if there are volunteers. We did at least once such "blackbox" testing of attacks affecting lightning implementation for the dust outputs inflation vuln, and since then the few skilled devs who knows how to set correctly lightning+bitcoind nodes are usually very busy.
Yes, usually for Core it's sticking to the transaction-relay / mempool defaults, as it's how the lightning specs are mostly written.
For the other questions: amount in channel - does not really matter as long as you can do few non dust outputs (i.e above `GetDustThreshold`) how many channels - only two are necessary for all the pinning kind of stuff, maybe one more to rebalance the liquidty accordingly should volunteers have channels with each other? is there any aspect of topology you require? - no, for the simple scenario it's only a routing node setup network connectivity - no Tor connections doesn't play to test the easy scenarios.
If you wish to catch-up a bit on all those attacks, see that years-old gist of mine which was documenting a bit transaction-relay jamming: https://gist.github.com/ariard/7e509bf2c81ea8049fd0c67978c521af
After browsing it again, a lot of the stuff is still actual, the only big thing missing is the replacement cycling attack. That one I still have remorses towards the whole bitcoin community to not have caught it back at the time in 2020, and that it took me 2 more years to find it.
Best, Antoine ots hash: fbbc40b46cdf7c2877b5e2720519fd3dcaa99dbd1ac96ac5cbd0c08f0c3e94e5 Le vendredi 11 octobre 2024 à 16:23:47 UTC+1, waxwing/ AdamISZ a écrit :
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> Antoine, > > Perhaps it would be an idea to write a gist or some other public facing > page with what you need from volunteers, so it's kind of step by step? > Unlike Peter in this thread, I think most people would want/have to set up > new nodes to do this. > > You have said: Current and default installs of Core/btcd + lnd/cln/ldk . I > know that e.g. Core has some pretty non-trivial choices but I guess we can > stick religiously to whatever is default. > > But other details like: > amount in channels - does it matter? > How many channels? Channels of specific types (thinking e.g. unannounced) > Should volunteers have channels with each other? is there any aspect of > topology you require? > Network connectivity - I guess it's not important, but just in case worth > mentioning, e.g. should/should not use Tor etc. > > Forgive me if some of the questions are ignorant, I have not paid a ton of > attention to the discussion around these attacks. > > waxwing/AdamISZ > On Thursday, October 10, 2024 at 6:29:02 PM UTC-6 Antoine Riard wrote: > >> Hi all, >> >> > If you have an on-chain donation address on the OTS website (?), I'll >> make a >> > $100 donation now, it's a nice tool. And for the justice >> transaction...well >> > for some scenarios you can use the latest valid commitment state to pin >> no risk >> > of being slashed by a justice transaction. >> >> Been late on demonstrating a real-world pinning attack against a >> production lightning >> node. But I swear it's real sport having to jungle with more than one >> category of >> exploit to soundly test. >> >> OTS is a great project. I'll make a donation to it of 1 gram of gold or >> the equivalent >> in fiats or satoshis at settlement (as $100 sounds to be almost equal to >> 1 gram of gold, >> i.e $84.66 those days) for each month late on doing a demonstrationg of >> real-world pinning >> attack, as a lateness penalty. >> >> Beyond it's a great tool to make notarization of any kind of digital >> info, inside the >> chain where for every block there are probably two-digit terawatt hours >> burnt, which >> starts to be a f*cking lot of hydro power plants. >> >> More generally, I called since late 2020 at least for making real-world >> demonstration >> of pinning attacks against lightning nodes, among others types of >> cross-layers attacks, >> At the exception of 2 ligthning protocol devs if my memory is correct, >> all the others >> ones since then have shunned away from participating in a real-world >> demo, and Peter >> Todd was the first one to consent and make available a lightning node >> available for >> real-world demos in a "black box" fashion (indeed, it's far easier to >> execute exploits >> on testing envs fully set by the researcher...). >> >> In the future, I believe it can only be great if bitcoin security >> exploits are gauged >> more or less on the lines of artifacts available, evaluated and >> reproduced, as done >> usually by major infosec confs. >> >> Best, >> Antoine >> ots hash: 9d227f7832154c4c8bce9fce260ac84537489c1bc8c4b8c2ba990ceb197c84fc >> Le mardi 3 septembre 2024 à 21:13:46 UTC+1, Antoine Riard a écrit : >> >>> > That also happens to be my Alice OpenTimestamps calendar, in >>> production, so >>> > please don't do anything you expect to be CPU or RAM intensive. But if >>> you >>> > accidentally take down the server, not the end of the world: OTS is a >>> very >>> > redundant protocol and one calendar going down for a few hours is >>> unlikely to >>> > do any harm. >>> > >>> > It has about $400 of outgoing capacity at the moment, and $2000 >>> inbound. It >>> > gets hardly any donations at the moment, so if you manage to knock LND >>> offline >>> > that's no big deal. >>> > >>> > That's not my money - it's donations to the OTS calendars that I have >>> no right >>> > to spend - so I'll ask you to pay for any expenses incurred by it >>> during >>> > testing, and make a $100 net donation when you're done testing to make >>> it >>> > worthwhile for the OTS community. If you manage to lose more than that >>> on >>> > justice transactions, I'll consider that a donation. :) >>> >>> Many thanks Peter for that. >>> >>> No worries, I won't play with CPU or RAM, it's just all the >>> transaction-relay >>> and mempool logic that one can interfere with. I'll make you whole of >>> the $2400 >>> if the LND node goes down too hard, though I'm just looking for a node >>> running >>> on mainnet, for a pinning the attacker has two open to channels and >>> re-balance >>> the liquidity at its advantage a bit. I'll provide the liquidity by >>> myself. >>> >>> If you have an on-chain donation address on the OTS website (?), I'll >>> make a >>> $100 donation now, it's a nice tool. And for the justice >>> transaction...well >>> for some scenarios you can use the latest valid commitment state to pin >>> no risk >>> of being slashed by a justice transaction. >>> >>> Best, >>> Antoine >>> ots hash: >>> 19d9b61ed5238e2922205a0a0194e0830b260a691f45b4189b1d145f72c9e031 >>> >>> Le mar. 3 sept. 2024 à 13:58, Peter Todd <pe...@petertodd•org> a écrit : >>> >>>> On Tue, Aug 27, 2024 at 02:10:15PM -0700, Antoine Riard wrote: >>>> > My utmost pleasure to demonstrate some pinning attacks on nodes under >>>> > real-world conditions. >>>> >>>> Antoine Riard: until Oct 1st, you have permission to test your attacks >>>> against >>>> my Lightning node running at: >>>> >>>> 023345274dd80a01c0e80ec4892818878...@alice•opentimestamps•org:9735 >>>> <http://023345274dd80a01c0e80ec48928188783f9bc5281be8f5057c050492f10711a5b@alice.opentimestamps.org:9735> >>>> >>>> That also happens to be my Alice OpenTimestamps calendar, in >>>> production, so >>>> please don't do anything you expect to be CPU or RAM intensive. But if >>>> you >>>> accidentally take down the server, not the end of the world: OTS is a >>>> very >>>> redundant protocol and one calendar going down for a few hours is >>>> unlikely to >>>> do any harm. >>>> >>>> It has about $400 of outgoing capacity at the moment, and $2000 >>>> inbound. It >>>> gets hardly any donations at the moment, so if you manage to knock LND >>>> offline >>>> that's no big deal. >>>> >>>> That's not my money - it's donations to the OTS calendars that I have >>>> no right >>>> to spend - so I'll ask you to pay for any expenses incurred by it during >>>> testing, and make a $100 net donation when you're done testing to make >>>> it >>>> worthwhile for the OTS community. If you manage to lose more than that >>>> on >>>> justice transactions, I'll consider that a donation. :) >>>> >>>> -- >>>> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org >>>> >>>