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ExploreRabbit Hole · Custody and Privacy · Intermediate · 20 min

Multisig and Inheritance

Whether one key is enough for what you hold, how a two-of-three wallet is set up, with the checks that catch the usual mistakes, and how the right person reaches your bitcoin if you cannot.

Where you're going: Two questions come up after the Journey. Is one key enough for what you hold, or do you want a wallet that needs two keys out of three, called multisig? And if something happens to you, can the right person reach your coins? This page sets out the case for and against multisig as published guides and makers put it, a set-up order that includes the checks that are easy to skip, and an inheritance plan that works with one key or with three. It is for someone who has finished the Journey and holds real bitcoin, or may.

Short answers.

  • Do you need multisig? Most of the guides cited here would not start you on it, and a multisig wallet set up badly can be less safe than one key kept well. See Do you need it?
  • What if something happens to you? That matters at any amount. See If something happens to you.
  • Did someone who holds bitcoin send you here? Start at If you are the person they chose. The rest is written for the owner.

What can go wrong?

Three things can take coins from someone who keeps their own keys.

  • Loss. Every copy of the seed words is gone or wrong, and so is the wallet.
  • Theft. Someone else gets the words.
  • Coercion. Someone forces you to hand the coins over.
A triangle with three corners labeled THEFT (someone finds your seed), LOSS (fire, flood, forgotten), and COERCION (wrench, warrant, kidnap). At the geometric center is a pill labeled YOUR SEED. The three threats every seed backup must plan against.
Three threats. Guarding against one often weakens the guard against another.

A second copy of your words protects against loss and gives a thief a second place to look, as Blockchain Commons, which publishes custody guides, says of ordinary backups.

A fourth danger is not on the triangle, and in the FBI's complaint figures, which count crimes and not accidents, it is by far the largest. Of the money people told the FBI they lost in 2025 in cases involving bitcoin and coins like it, more than four fifths, by this site's count, was sent by its owners to someone who had deceived them. No arrangement of keys prevents that.

What is multisig?

The wallet you made in the Journey has one set of seed words, and whoever holds them can spend. A multisig wallet (short for multi-signature) is built from several sets, each on its own device, with a rule for how many must sign a payment. The usual example is two of three, also written 2-of-3: three keys, and any two can spend.

Two of three survives both accidents. A lost key leaves two that can still sign, and a stolen key gives the thief one signature where two are needed.

The lost-key half has a condition that the animation below leaves out, and missing it loses coins. Two keys can spend only if you also kept the wallet's set-up record: a block of text from the wallet program that lists the public part of all three keys and the rule. It holds no seed words and cannot spend. What to back up explains it.

Three keys, and any two sign, if you kept the set-up record. The animation's line about different makers states an aim, not a guarantee.

Do you need it?

The short answer of the guides that sell nothing is no, unless the amount is large. Here are five positions, each read on November 16, 2026.

  • Sparrow Wallet's guide (free wallet software): one key up to US$100,000, and above that at least two of three.
  • The Bitcoin Design Guide (for people who design bitcoin apps): several keys for large amounts and for knowledgeable or guided users, not for small amounts or newcomers.
  • BitBox, a maker of hardware wallets (November 2026): more devices do not by themselves make bitcoin safer, and someone who needs no shared control and cannot confidently check and recover such a wallet may be better served by one well-kept key.
  • Trezor, another maker: its devices work in multisig wallets, but for one person it recommends a simpler scheme of its own, a backup split into shares, and it calls multisig most appropriate for groups.
  • Casa, which sells multisig as a service and holds one of the keys: at most $1,000 on a phone's single key, then three keys up to $100,000 and five above (August 2023).

The course's own summary is fair: for an amount that would change your life, many advisers suggest multisig, though not all, and it is much harder to manage. Below that, keep one key well, with a backup tested before any coins went in.

What it takes

Three hardware wallets, from different makers. Each makes its own seed words. Sparrow's guide gives the reason: a flaw in one maker's product should not be able to compromise the whole wallet.

That has happened. On July 30, 2026, Coinkite, the maker of the Coldcard hardware wallet, published an advisory, and has updated it since. As it reads now: a bug in its firmware, the software inside the device, weakened the way the devices made seed words, and attackers worked out keys and stole funds. A two-of-three wallet with one such key and two from other makers was not exposed in the same way. One built only from affected devices was.

Different makers is a hedge, not a guarantee: makers reuse each other's published code (another maker's firmware includes a copy of Trezor's cryptography code), and three devices are three sets of updates to keep up with.

As examples only, the three devices on this site's wallets page, and what each maker documented about multisig on November 16, 2026:

  • Jade (Blockstream): the wallet is registered on the device and confirmed on its screen.
  • BitBox02 Nova, Bitcoin-only edition (BitBox): its devices register the wallet after showing you the rule and every key.
  • Trezor Safe 5, Bitcoin-only (Trezor): its devices work in multisig wallets made with other programs.

Buy only from the maker's own shop, never from a reseller or second-hand: the wallets page says how. Check first, on the maker's own site or the program's, that the two are documented to work together.

A coordinator. A program on your computer, it knows the public part of each key, makes the wallet's addresses and prepares payments for the devices to sign. It holds no seed words and cannot spend. Two examples, read on November 16, 2026: Sparrow Wallet (sparrowwallet.com) and Specter Desktop (specter.solutions), both free, with their code published. Neither has a phone app. Both explain how to check that a download is genuine: do it. Specter's makers add that it is used at your own risk. Electrum's guide, by contrast, describes no single set-up record. Take updates only from the maker's own site or app, opened by you: none has you type seed words into a computer or a phone.

A coordinator that asks a public server shows that server your balance, which is why Sparrow's guide pairs multisig with a server you run yourself: see Run Your Own Node.

Setting it up, in order

Set aside at least two uninterrupted hours, as Blockchain Commons advises for its own set-up, which makes other choices. No step has you type seed words into a computer, a phone or a web page.

  1. Set up each device by itself. If a device already holds a wallet with coins, do not reset it: use a new one, or first move those coins to another wallet of your own. Install the maker's current firmware, with the maker's own app, before the device makes its words (on a Jade, from a computer: its phone app offers the update only after set-up). Then have it show you new seed words on its own screen. On a BitBox, choose to write the words down: otherwise it saves its backup to a memory card. On a Trezor, choose Legacy Backup Types for 12 or 24 words: otherwise it makes a 20-word backup of another kind. Each set goes on paper, by hand, under the course's rules. Write each device's PIN or password down too, and keep it apart from the device.

  2. Give the coordinator the public part of each key. Software calls it an xpub. Tell the coordinator the rule, two of three, and it builds the wallet.

  3. Save the set-up record. The coordinator can now export one record that holds all three public keys and the rule. Print it. The next section says why, and where not to keep it.

  4. Load the wallet onto each device. Until a device has been shown the whole wallet it knows only its own key, and cannot tell you whether an address is yours. Load only the record your own coordinator made. A Jade or a BitBox has you confirm the wallet on its own screen: over a cable, it asks the first time you have it show an address (step 5). Compare each key it shows, in full, with your print before you approve, on every device: a device checks only that its own key is there. A Trezor has no such step and keeps no copy of the wallet. It shows an address only if its own key is in the wallet. It can show the other keys too, but in a spelling that may differ from your print (Zpub for xpub) and cannot then be compared with it by eye. So never rely on a Trezor alone: check each address on a device that remembers the wallet as well.

  5. Check a receive address on the devices' own screens. A compromised computer can show you an address that is not yours. Ask the coordinator for an address, have a device display it, and compare the whole address, not only its first and last characters. Before any coins go in, have all three devices show the first address: it must be the same on each. For any large payment later, use two devices from different makers.

  6. Test before the coins go in, in three ways.

    • The record. Read a copy of the record (never seed words), a printed copy if your program can read one, back into the same program on your own computer, under a new name. The same first address should appear: compare the whole of it with the one a device showed you.
    • The papers. Where a device can check its backup without being wiped, use that. Where it cannot, wipe it now, while its key guards no coins anywhere, restore it from its paper, and repeat steps 4 and 5: a device that shows the same first address again has the right words. If it does not, nothing is lost. Start again from step 1.
    • The keys. Send in a small amount from your old wallet. Spend part of it back to your old wallet with the first and second devices, and the rest with the third device and either of the others. Now each device has signed.

    Only then move the rest from your old wallet, in steps.

  7. To spend, the coordinator prepares the payment and passes it to one device and then another, by cable, file or QR code, in a form called a PSBT. Check the amount and the whole address on each device before it signs. With two signatures, the coordinator sends the payment.

What to back up

A single-key wallet has one thing to back up. A multisig wallet has two.

The seed words of each key. Three sets, each on its own paper. One of the course's four rules is relaxed here: a key's paper may stay in one place, because the other two keys are its spare.

The set-up record. Wallet software calls it the output descriptor, the wallet configuration or the wallet export file. You need not be able to read it. You need to keep it.

Every address in the wallet is made from all three public keys, and two sets of seed words give you only two of them. Without the third, software cannot work out which addresses are yours, so it cannot find the coins, let alone spend them. BIP 87, one of the published standards for these wallets, says a restore needs every key holder's public key as well as the seeds.

So "lose one key and you can still spend" is true only with the record. All three sets of seed words together can rebuild the wallet. Any two cannot.

The record holds no seed words and cannot spend, so it needs less secrecy than a seed, and you can keep more copies of it. Less is not none:

  • Anyone who reads it can see the wallet's balance and every payment in and out. Keep it out of email, photographs and online accounts, and send it to nobody: no helper needs it.
  • Anyone who can swap your copy for a changed one could trick you into paying a wallet that is not yours. That is why step 4 uses a copy you printed yourself, and why you accept a record from nobody.

Never write seed words on it. Keep a copy with each key's seed words and one with your instructions for whoever comes after you.

Where the pieces go

Sparrow's guide asks for the devices and their backups to be kept safe, ideally in different places. The aim is that no single fire, flood or burglary reaches two different keys.

A device and the paper for the same key are one key, so they may share a place: Specter's guide gives three places as the least you need. With more places, keep each paper apart from its device, and still never two different keys together.

A bank's safe deposit box is one option for one key. The FDIC, the US agency that insures bank deposits, adds three cautions: the contents are not insured by the FDIC and generally not by the bank, no box is completely protected from theft, fire or flood, and after the renter's death the rules for opening it depend on state law.

Someone you know in person is another option: they can hold one device, locked by its PIN, while its paper is kept in a place that holds no other key, or else the paper, sealed in a tamper-evident bag whose number you keep and check yearly. One key cannot spend, two holders together can, and no holder needs to see the words.

If a key is lost, stolen or flawed

With one key gone you can still spend, but you have no spare, and with one more gone the coins are locked. Blockchain Commons' advice is to move to a new wallet promptly. Build it from your two good keys and one new one, test it as in step 6 without wiping either device you still have (they still guard the old wallet), and move the coins to it. The new wallet has a new set-up record: load it onto each device and, once the old wallet is empty, replace every old copy and bring the letter up to date.

The same goes for a key that someone may have seen or copied, and for a key that was made badly. A stolen letter of instructions is a map to every key: move the pieces to new places first, and write a new letter. If one of yours came from a device covered by the July 2026 advisory (in the sources below), replace it: updating the firmware does not repair seed words that were already made.

One case is different. Where two affected keys could sign together, Casa's write-up calls it urgent. It says not to send a test payment out of the old wallet, not to move the coins in steps, and not to send the one payment by the ordinary public route, since a watching thief can overtake any payment that leaves such a wallet. The maker's advisory asks for a small test first, and makes no exception for this case. The two disagree: read both, in the sources below, before you move anything. Take the small amount for step 6 from somewhere else, and send it back there.

Do not let anyone hurry you. The advisory itself asks for calm and care, and news like this brings impostors, who make the first contact. Treat any call, message or letter about your wallet as a theft, however official it looks, and open the maker's own site yourself. No part of the move has you type seed words into a computer, a phone or a web page, or give them to anyone, and nobody gives you an address to move coins to.

For owners of a device named in that advisory only. The advisory lists the models and firmware versions, the newer models among them, with one gap. Engineers at Block, a payments company that also makes a hardware wallet, date the fault from firmware 4.0.0 on the Mk2 and Mk3 models, one release before the advisory's 4.0.1, so treat any 4.x firmware before 4.2.0 on those two as affected. The advisory exempts only seeds made with at least 50 fair, independent, private dice rolls added on the device, and says to replace the seed if you are not sure.

If something happens to you

If you die, three things stand between your coins and the person you want to have them. Blockchain Commons lists them: nobody will tell that person the coins exist, no company can unlock them, and the steps are unfamiliar. A lawyer who trains lawyers on the subject made the second point to the American Bar Association's magazine in 2018: a bank obeys a court's order, and here there is often nobody for a court to order. The same holds if you are alive but too ill to act, when someone may need the coins to pay for your care.

So a plan has two halves. The practical half lets the right person find and use what opens the wallet. The legal half decides whose the coins are and who may move them. A letter can do the first. Only a will, a trust or the law does the second.

If you are the person they chose

  • Now. Ask the owner to tell you that the coins exist, where the letter and the paper are kept, what the paper's words open, and who the executor is (the person a will names to carry it out). The words are the 12 or 24 seed words written on that paper. Whoever has them can take the coins, so do not ask to see them.
  • If the day comes. Let nobody hurry you. Read the letter. Speak to the executor, or a lawyer you choose yourself, before you move anything: in many places nobody may deal with a dead person's property until a court allows it, and then it is the executor, or whoever the court appoints, who may. If the owner is alive but cannot act, you need a power of attorney or a court's order first.
  • Never. Never type the words into a web page, an email or a message, never photograph them, and never show them or read them out to anyone: they go only into the kind of wallet the letter names, got from its maker's own site and never from a search. Never pay anyone who offers to recover the coins. A stranger who finds you first and offers to help is a thief.

The practical half: one person and a letter

For a small amount in one wallet, the course's advice stands. One person you know in person, and would trust with the coins, should know that the paper exists, where it is, and what its words open. Whoever knows where the paper is can take the coins, so choose with care.

A short letter of instructions makes that knowledge last. It is advice from people who work on custody, and it is not a legal document. Blockchain Commons publishes a sample, and the lawyer quoted in the ABA's magazine listed much the same contents.

In the letter:

  • What you hold and roughly what it is worth, and the date.
  • The wallet app or device, and any program on the computer, each with its maker's web address.
  • Where each thing is kept. For multisig: each key and its PIN, the set-up record, and the fact that any two keys will do.
  • Someone they already know in person who understands bitcoin, to ask for help.
  • The rules, since they may never have taken the course: the words go into the wallet itself, never into a web page, and nobody who offers to help needs them, least of all someone who offers to recover the coins.
  • A line telling them to speak to the executor or a lawyer of their own choosing before they move anything.

Never in the letter: the seed words, a PIN or a password. Say where each is kept, not what it is.

A letter like this is a map, as sensitive as what it points to. Blockchain Commons suggests two versions: a specific one kept somewhere secure, and a vague one for anywhere less safe.

Knowing where the paper is gives someone the power to move the coins, not the right to. What follows is what courts and government sites say in a few places. It is not legal advice: the law differs between countries and between US states, and for more than a small amount, ask a lawyer who handles wills.

  • Who inherits. A will lets you decide. Without one, the law decides, as the UK government's site and US state courts both say.
  • Keep the words out of the will. The will says who the bitcoin is for. It holds neither the seed words nor where they are kept. Where they are kept goes in the letter, which you keep private. A will does not stay private: once it has been filed with a court after a death, or accepted by it, the public can usually read it or order a copy, as courts and government sites say for North Carolina, California, New South Wales, and England and Wales.
  • Who may act. In many places nobody has authority over a dead person's property until a court gives it. A California court's page says so of executors, and guidance for England and Wales says to make no financial plans until probate, the legal right to deal with what a person left, is granted.
  • Tax. The UK's tax office counts the coins as part of what you leave and asks for their value on the date of death. In the United States an heir's later gain is generally measured from that day's value.
  • If you are alive but cannot act. The same letter serves, but the law is different. In many places the document that lets someone act for you is a power of attorney, made in advance (in England and Wales, a lasting power of attorney). Without one, the US consumer finance agency says, a friend or relative may have to ask a court to appoint a guardian.

If the wallet is multisig

A left-to-right diagram titled Inheritance Recovery. An heir, on the left, finds a letter kept in the owner's files. The letter points to three places, each holding a seed with a copy of the set-up record, which the figure labels descriptor: Seed 1 at home, Seed 2 at the bank, and Seed 3 at a relative's. Seed 1 and Seed 2 are orange, meaning collected. Seed 3 is gray and marked 'not needed'. The two collected seeds lead to a box labeled Coordinator, 'any 2 of 3 sign', with the note 'needs the descriptor too', and from there to Funds recovered. A line along the bottom reads: No plan = coins lost forever. With a plan, heirs have a path. Pick the plan.
After a death, the rules for opening a bank box depend on state law, so another pair of keys may be quicker than the figure's. The words go into a hardware wallet, never into the coordinator.

An heir to a multisig wallet has more to find and more to do: two of the three keys, the set-up record, and a coordinator to bring them together. A key here means a device and its PIN, or else the paper with that key's seed words, which go into a new hardware wallet of the same make, bought from its maker's own shop, and never into a computer, a phone or a web page.

Test the plan

A plan that nobody has tried is a guess. Test it without touching your real seed words.

  1. The skill. Ask the person to take the Journey's chapter Keys: What You Actually Hold. It has them bring a practice wallet back from paper, with coins that are worth nothing.
  2. The letter. Have them read it and tell you, step by step, where they would go and what they would do. Fix what they stumble on. Do not open the real paper for this, and never test a backup by wiping a wallet that holds coins.
  3. For multisig, the motions. Let them sign a small payment at the coordinator, in the same room as you.

Blockchain Commons has its readers check each storage place once a year: that the papers are there and readable, and that the letter is still true. Date the letter again whenever anything moves.

Other ways to arrange it

Two more arrangements exist, and this page recommends neither.

Some companies sell multisig as a service: they keep one key and run an inheritance procedure. Ask who can start that procedure, how you would stop it, and what happens to the plan if the company closes. No such company needs your seed words.

Other wallets add a timelock: a rule, enforced by the network, that lets a second key spend only after the coins have sat unmoved for a set time. Liana (in the sources below) is an open-source example. To keep the second key locked out, its owner has to move each coin before that clock runs out, and it cannot be restored without its set-up record.

The short version

One key, kept well, is what most of these guides would give most holders, and the letter and the legal half apply to them as much as to anyone. The aim is a plan you will keep up, and one that the people after you can follow.

Pro tip: If you do one thing from this page, do the smallest. Choose your one person, and write the letter with them.

More in Custody and Privacy

Sources

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